


# A Perceptual Confirmation Bias from Approximate Online Inference

Richard D. Lange<sup>1</sup>, Ankani Chattoraj<sup>1</sup>, Matthew Hochberg<sup>1</sup>, Jeffry M. Beck<sup>2</sup>, Jacob Yates<sup>1</sup>, Ralf M. Haefner<sup>1</sup>


1. Brain and Cognitive Sciences, University of Rochester, 2. Department of Neurobiology, Duke University

## Introduction

In **evidence integration** tasks, subjects make a categorical decision from a sequence of (typically i.i.d.) sensory information. A **psychophysical kernel (PK)** quantifies the ‘weight’ subjects give to evidence in space or in time. A **confirmation bias (CB)** occurs when people upweight information confirming existing beliefs, thus strengthening those beliefs. A **Perceptual CB** implies a PK that decreases over time. Different studies have reported different temporal PK shapes, typically flat or decreasing.



## Our Framework



**Category information:** probability of an ideal observer guessing the category of a single ‘frame’  $x_t$  given  $C$


We define **sensory** or **likelihood information** as the probability of guessing  $x_t$  given  $e_t$

## Experiments


We used an orientation-discrimination paradigm with orientation-band-pass stimuli.

- In the **LSHC context** staircase on the **noise** is run to reach 70% performance
- In the **HSLC context**, a staircase is run on  $p_{prior}$
- Both tasks’ staircases begin at the same set of parameters.

### Task Design



### Behavioral Results



**Change in PK slopes** consistent with our framework’s predictions, but significant variability between subjects (possibly explained by different  $\gamma$ ?).

### Sampling Model<sup>[5,6]</sup>

Generative model:

$C$  = category / decision-area  
 $x$  = sensory representation  
 $e$  = evidence

**Goal:** compute posterior over  $C$  given  $e$

$$p(C|e_1, \dots, e_T) \propto p(C) \prod_{t=1}^T p(e_t|C)$$

...using **online updates**

$$\begin{aligned} \log \frac{p_t(C=+1)}{p_t(C=-1)} &\equiv \log \frac{p(C=+1|e_1, \dots, e_t)}{p(C=-1|e_1, \dots, e_t)} \\ &= \log \frac{p_{t-1}(C=+1)}{p_{t-1}(C=-1)} + \log \frac{p(e_t|C=+1)}{p(e_t|C=-1)} \end{aligned}$$

update to log posterior odds each frame

...using **importance sampling** from the **full posterior** to marginalize over the sensory variable  $x$

$$p(e_t|C=c) = \int p(e_t|x_t)p(x_t|C=c) \approx \frac{1}{S} \sum_{x_t^{(i)} \sim Q} p(e_t|x_t^{(i)})p(x_t^{(i)}|C=c)/Q(x_t^{(i)})$$

$$\log \frac{p(e_t|C=+1)}{p(e_t|C=-1)} \approx \log \frac{\sum p(x_t^{(i)}|C=+1)w_i}{\sum p(x_t^{(i)}|C=-1)w_i}$$


$$w_i = \left( \sum_c p(x_t^{(i)}|C=c)p_{t-1}(C=c) \right)^{-1}$$

**Final update rule:**


$$\log \frac{p_t(C=+1)}{p_t(C=-1)} \approx \log \frac{p_{t-1}(C=+1)}{p_{t-1}(C=-1)} + \log \frac{\sum_{i=1}^S p(x_t^{(i)}|C=+1)w_i}{\sum_{i=1}^S p(x_t^{(i)}|C=-1)w_i} - \gamma \log \frac{p_{t-1}(C=+1)}{p_{t-1}(C=-1)}$$

bias correction (small  $S$ )

Sampling Model  
gamma = 0



Sampling Model  
gamma = 0.1



### Variational (Parametric) Model<sup>[7,8]</sup>

Same setup and objective as sampling model, except approximation is due to **mean field assumption**:


$$p(C, x|e) \approx q(C)q(x)$$

Inference is be done using Mean Field Variational Bayes, which passes messages between  $q(C)$  and  $q(x)$  to approach a minimum of  $KL(q||p)$ . Here, the updates (with an auxiliary variable  $z$ ) are:


$$\log q(C) = \log p(C) + \mu_z \mu_x / \sigma_x^2 \quad \log q(z) = \log p(z) + \mu_C \mu_x / \sigma_x^2$$

$$q(x) = \mathcal{N} \left( x; \frac{\sigma_e^2 \mu_C + \sigma_x^2 \mu_z e}{\sigma_x^2 + \sigma_e^2}, \frac{\sigma_x^2 \sigma_e^2}{\sigma_x^2 + \sigma_e^2} \right)$$

Variational Model  
gamma = 0



Variational Model  
gamma = 0.1



## Conclusions

Feedback of priors is required for sensory areas to represent full posteriors, but potentially at the cost of biased evidence accumulation due to “double counting” the prior.

This **perceptual confirmation bias** effect explains discrepancy in past studies as well as within-subject differences in the present study.

## References

- [1] Nienborg, H., & Cumming, B. G. (2009). Decision-related activity in sensory neurons reflects more than a neuron’s causal effect. *Nature*, 459(7243), 89–92.
- [2] Kiani, R., Hanks, T. D., & Shadlen, M. N. (2008). Bounded integration in parietal cortex underlies decisions even when viewing duration is dictated by the environment. *The Journal of Neuroscience*, 8(12), 3017–3029.
- [3] Brunton, B. W., Botvinick, M. M., & Brody, C. D. (2013). Rats and humans can optimally accumulate evidence for decision-making. *Science*, 340(6128), 95–98.
- [4] Wyart, V., Gardelle, V., De, Scholl, J., & Summerfield, C. (2012). Rhythmic Fluctuations in Evidence Accumulation during Decision Making in the Human Brain. *Neuron*, 76(4), 847–858.
- [5] Haefner, R. M., Berkes, P., & Fiser, J. (2016). Perceptual Decision-Making as Probabilistic Inference by Neural Sampling. *Neuron*, 90, 649–660.
- [6] Fiser, J. J., Berkes, P., Orbán, G., & Lengyel, M. (2010). Statistically optimal perception and learning: from behavior to neural representations. *Trends in Cognitive Sciences*, 14(3), 119–130.
- [7] Raju, R. V., & Pitkow, X. (2016). Inference by Reparameterization in Neural Population Codes. *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems*, 30.
- [8] Murphy, K. (2012) Probabilistic Machine Learning.